October 9, 2017

Greetings Principal Hull:

Thank you for the opportunity to visit your school. While the purpose of our visit is to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of your school, the rewarding part of our work is observing an environment that both nurtures and educates the children of Idaho.

You will receive a copy of the assessor's spreadsheet noting the observations made as a part of the assessment process. The observation instrument is divided into nine distinct components for ease of reference. The demographic section is an extensive description of your student-body, staff and facility, which is intended as an aid to future planning, and is not included in the Executive Summary.

In addition, you will receive an Executive Summary document. As you review the Executive Summary, you will find areas that meet the expected standard of care reflected in the School Safety and Security Strength Profile Graph. The seven sections that make-up the profile are reported individually with only those questions that reveal a distinct vulnerability being noted. This will allow you to target the areas for improvement that will strengthen your safety and security profile. Also included is an intruder assessment reporting. This section provides the results of an un-credentialed assessor attempting to enter the school without following the visitor policy.

We realize you, your faculty, and staff are faced with an increasing number of responsibilities, and as such, we have sought to keep the threat assessment process as unobtrusive as possible. Adhering to the two primary goals of keeping a minimal impact on the educational process and completing the assessment in a timely manner ensures that the assessment is extensive, not exhaustive. In a number of questions, we record answers based on "as reported" information by staff, realizing the individual(s) responding may not have a full understanding of the systems in place. However, a uniformed or untrained staff member allows for the same vulnerability as if the system were not in place at all.

We are quick to assert that our perspective is but a single day snapshot view, while you and your staff see the fullness of your work over many hours, days, weeks, and months. Given the noted limitations, these observations may or may not represent the general practices that occur routinely in your school.

Accordingly, we respectfully submit our report of your school and provide the information for your future planning considerations.

Please contact us if you have any questions regarding the process or information in this report.

Respectfully yours,

Mark Feddersen

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

## School District: Orofino Joint School District #171
Name of School: Orofino Jr Sr High School
School Administrator(s): Principal Hull
Assessment Date: October 9. 2017

School Safety and Security Strength Profile:

The spider graph below is reflective of all of the protective factors observed during the assessment process. These elements, divided into seven specific sections, and displayed together, are the graphic representation of your school's safety and security profile. It may be useful to think of this as the "shield" between your school community and the threat environment school's face. The balance of the assessment report is by necessity deficiency based and will point out specific vulnerabilities that if addressed will strengthen your school's safety and security profile.

School Safety Security Profile

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Intruder Assessment:

This component is reflective of the results of a non-credentialed member of the assessment team attempting to gain access to the interior of the school without following visitor protocol.

- At about 0740 hours, I began my walkabout of Orofino Jr Sr High School. I was wearing no identifying clothing and no visible credentials.

  I observed three ingress points that students were using to enter the school. I saw adults near two of the entrances so I picked the third one that only had students around. I walked past several students, exchanged pleasantries, and entered the unlocked doors to the school.

  I made my way through the school speaking with a few teachers and passing several students in the hallways. While speaking with the teachers, I inquired of their emergency procedures, which they provided. The staff and students were pleasant and cooperative.

  When school started, I ended my intruder assessment and checked in at the main office.

Special and/or Unique Conditions (*If applicable)*

This component is presented in narrative format and is descriptive of unique configurations of physical plant, unusual and/or unique programs or unusual operational practices that may increase your threat potential and has the potential to create heightened vulnerability.

- **During my assessment of Orofino Jr Sr High School, I noted four unique conditions that increase the threat vulnerability at the school.**

  o A significant threat potential is from the Idaho State Medium Security Correctional Institution, which was built directly across from the school. To help mitigate this exposure, it is imperative that the administrators from the facilities have a great working relationship, established notification procedures, and known emergency procedure expectations, if something should develop. Meeting at least twice a year is recommended to help with the aforementioned mitigation recommendations.

  o Another substantial threat potential, located near the High School, is Idaho State Hospital North, which is a psychiatric hospital that provides treatment for adults in psychiatric crisis. Again, to help mitigate this exposure, it is vital that the administrators from the facilities have a great working relationship, established notification procedures, and known emergency procedure expectations, if something should develop.

  o "ManiYAC" Center is used for after school programs for Orofino Jr Sr High School students. The building is owned by the School District and located at the end of one of the High School's parking lot. Due to the proximity of the High School and possible

Brian Armes – Manager   Guy Bliesner – East Idaho   Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho   Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov   Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov   Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov   Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155   208.221.3145   208.407.6716   208.625.7256

Page 3 **of** 16

overlaps in operation (especially at the end of the school day), it is recommended building administrators, who are not District employees, meet to discuss emergency and notification procedures.

o   Part of Shriver Road runs through the main lower section of the High School's parking lot. This unusual traffic engineering creates vulnerability, to the school, by allowing unchecked and unmonitored residential traffic directly through the school parking zone. It is recommended the roadway be closed off during the hours of school operation to mitigate this exposure.

Brian Armes – Manager	Guy Bliesner – East Idaho	Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho	Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov	Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov	Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov	Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155	208.221.3145	208.407.6716	208.625.7256

Student Supervision:

The report for this section is reflective of the observed practices in student supervision, in the designated areas, on the date of assessment. The overall score for student supervision is a composite of the observations for all the student-occupied areas observed. For clarity of reporting, the results are divided into three categories; General Supervision, Supervision of High Risk Instructional Spaces, and Supervision of Outdoor Spaces. The assessment criteria is based on the description of effective supervision included below.

An effective student supervision program includes a sufficient number of easily identifiable staff, who are actively engaged and able to communicate campus-wide. Effective supervision results in safe movement, a limited number of unaddressed student behaviors, and a secure supervised area. For the purposes of this assessment, the term student supervision includes the oversight of all areas on a school campus. Implicit in the term are the components of direct student management, along with, intruder detection and management of student/traffic interaction. The assessment process of student supervision is broken into the three elements listed below.

*The first element of student supervision assessment is **Presence**. This assessment standard determines if staff member is present in all student occupied spaces.*

*The second element of student supervision assessment measures if supervision is **Sufficient** to the space and conditions. This element takes into account the size of space, observability of the space, as well as the number and needs of student(s) under supervision. The visibility and activities of the supervisor can play a role in the measurement of sufficiency.*

*The third element of student supervision assessment examines the **Effectiveness** of the supervisor. Effectiveness is measured by both the behavior of the staff member and the behaviors of the students under supervision. An effective supervisor demonstrates a blend of both proactive and responsive interactions, and a consistent focus on the task of supervision. Consistently effective supervision is evidenced by student behaviors that are primarily positive and negative student behaviors that are promptly addressed. The communications capability of the supervisor with both students and administration is a part of this element.*

Observations/Review:

- Staff were not observed monitoring **all** entrances and exits during student arrival & departure.

  Note: I did observe good supervision at the school but because numerous doors were left unlocked it made it impossible for the school to monitor them ALL. Reducing the amount of doors open, the time they are open, and scheduling staff to areas that are unlocked (etc.) will increase the school's security position.

Brian Armes – Manager	Guy Bliesner – East Idaho	Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho	Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov	Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov	Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov	Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155	208.221.3145	208.407.6716	208.625.7256

Page 5 of 16

Operations:

This component is descriptive of observations of the operational processes in place to assure a safe and secure school environment. This section reviews the organizational or human elements and is exclusive of the systems or hardware involved. Included are sections reviewing the processes for access control, communications, maintenance, safety procedures and equipment, traffic/parking and student training. The assessment criteria is based on the description of effective practices included below.

Effective access control operations include procedures that assure visitors are routed to specific controlled or monitored entrances, are credentialed, and accounted for. Also included is consistent credentialing for staff and students as well as the control of unauthorized access to all spaces interior to a school.

Effective communications procedures require schools regularly verify the functionality of communications process and systems. The procedure should assure contact with parents is provided as required.

Effective maintenance practices provide for and document the ongoing review and repair of equipment to assure student and staff safety and security.

Effective operations in the safety equipment section assures that the noted safety equipment is in place, functional, and in use when required.

Effective student training practices assures student training in the specific noted areas is provided both generally and individually, in cases of specific need. Included here is the requirement for documentation.

Observations/Review:

- Locker rooms are not secured when not in use.
- There is no procedure in place for dealing with suspicious and/or unauthorized deliveries.
- Parents are minimally or not notified of school safety information.
- Parents are minimally or not notified of emergency response expectations.
- Parents are minimally or not notified of character education programs.
- Acids are not stored in an appropriate corrosive materials cabinet.
  - *Chemistry Chemical Room needs approved corrosives cabinet.*
  - *Chemistry Chemical Room's ventilation should be checked, as odor was strong even with the door wide open.*
- There is no scheduled cycle for student training on suspicious person or activity.
  - *Note: Teach/Remind students not to open secured doors for visitors or allow them to 'piggyback'. Students should be educated on the importance of Situational Awareness and the primary goal of Prevention, through proactive safety and security. Students should be instructed to direct visitors to the main office for check-in. Students should deny entry or notify a staff member of non-compliance.*

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

- There is no scheduled cycle for student training on visitor policies.
- Weight room safety training is not documented.
  - ***Note: Hygiene protocol needs established to have the student wipe down equipment after use.***
- Stage/Auditorium safety protocols are not posted.
- Unauthorized vehicles are not effectively identified.

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Page 7 of 16

Facility/Physical Plant/ Systems:

This component is descriptive of observations of the physical plant, buildings, and campus. Included are the "hard parts", such as doors, locks, gates, life safety and communications systems, etc. Also included here are parking, loading, traffic areas, and all school signage.

Additionally, the equipment required for high risk instructional areas is reviewed here as well. This section can be particularly useful in planning for the fiscal implications of remodeling and upgrade.

Observations/Review:

- There is not a primary point of entry in each building.
  - **Note: Numerous exterior doors are open throughout the school day.**
- The campus contains outdoor hallways.
  - **Note: Hourly travel from the main building to the CTE building.**
- Instructional areas cannot notify the entire school campus.
  - **Note: Principal Hull was going to check to see if the telephone intercom system can be used to accomplish this function.**
- The public address system has no back-up power source.
- The intercom system does not have a backup power source.
- The telephone system has not backup power source.
- Cell phones are the primary communication method with instructional areas.
  - ***Note: Cell phone usage is usually restricted to two people. Portable radios can communicate with all users at the same time. In an emergency, this full access could be a valuable asset.***
- A campus radio system is not available and in use.
- School radios cannot contact emergency responders directly.
- The school cannot contact busses directly by radio.
- Art room first aid kit is not accessible or inadequate.
- Bus and parent pickup areas are comingled,
- A secure key storage system is not available to first responders.
- The building is not completely sprinkled.
- Staff members present in the building after regular hours are not required to sign in/out.
- The facility does not have a central station monitored fire alarm system.
- The main entrance is not well marked/apparent.
  - There are at least three doors that could be considered "the main entrance" for the school, especially to a visitor.
- Parking areas are not clearly signed.
- Campus buildings are not clearly identified and marked.
- Exterior doors are not identified on the inside and outside.
- Stairwells are not identified and marked.
- ***Stairwell Hazards:***

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Page 8 of 16

- o *The front concrete steps are deteriorated to the point of being unsafe to use (chunks missing from the steps). The handrails are also bent in certain areas. It is recommended the stairs be repaired.*
  - o *The top step to the school's football field is high and has metal rebar sticking out toward the usage area. The protruding metal is a safety hazard and it is recommended it be repaired.*
- Parent loading areas are not clearly signed.

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Page 9 **of** 16

Security:

This component is descriptive of observations of both the processes and systems, and equipment in place to control and monitor unauthorized access to school property. Also included are the processes to provide security for the hard assets contained in and around a school. The assessment criteria for the six sections included in the security section are described in the following:

Outer perimeter – Campus has a fenced perimeter with securable access points. Access points are secure at the time of assessment.

Outdoor Areas – Adequate lighting and signage are provided. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) elements are in place and mechanical/electrical equipment is fenced to prevent access. Portable classroom and other instructional space is within a secure perimeter. Required outdoor movement is within a secure perimeter.

External (building) perimeter – External doors are secured or monitored and identified by signage. Room numbers are visible in the windows. Doors have modern, flush mounted crash bars.

Internal – Access to Instructional areas secure when not in use. Room numbers/designations in place.

Secured Spaces - Access to all storage/custodial spaces secure. School owned vehicles secure when on campus.

Surveillance – System is fully functional and provides for appropriate passive monitoring. School owned busses provide for student surveillance.

Observations/Review:

- The campus perimeter is not completely fenced.
- Service roads are not gated and controlled.
- Outbuildings or portables are not fenced to prevent direct access.
- Mechanical/electrical equipment is not enclosed and secured.
- Campus pathways/sidewalks are obstructed or hazardous.
    - ***Note: The exposed metal water drainage pipe (near the front concrete stairs) is a hazard and consideration should be made to place a cover over the area.***
- Student movement paths extend beyond the secured perimeter.
- Crash bar exit devices can be chained closed.
    - The first exterior set of doors have been modified but the next set of doors have the handles that can be chained.
- Exterior doors have removable hinge pins.
- Non-entry, exterior doors have exterior hardware.
- Doorways to restricted areas are not identified.
- Doorways to restricted areas are not secured.

- Room numbers are not visible from outside the building. (Window placards)
- The main entry point to the facility is not controllable.
  - ***Note: The main entrance to the school does not provide controlled access to the school's office for check-in. Once a visitor enters into the school, s/he can easily veer up or down and be inside the school without challenge. The office staff is extremely busy with day to day activity and it is not possible to give full attention to the main entrance. This configuration creates a significant access vulnerability for the school.***
  - ***Installation of electronic locks, on selected front doors, coupled with a buzzer / camera system should be considered to mitigate the unrestricted access into the school.***
- Computer Labs are not locked when not in use.
  - ***Note: During my assessment, I found Computer Lab Room #10 unlocked, door stand opening, and unmonitored. School Computer Lab Rooms should be locked or monitored, in order to prevent / reduce vandalism / theft. A review of other areas where computers are stored is recommended.***
- Classrooms are not locked when not in use.
- Locker rooms are not locked when not in use.
- Access to the Stage/Auditorium is not controlled.
- Monitors are not available for passive monitoring.
  - ***Note: The school's security cameras are only accessible/viewable by school administrators and are primarily used as an investigation tool. Providing a passive monitoring screen, in the main office area, would significantly enhance surveillance capabilities, of high concern areas, and assist with behavior modification of upset visitors who see themselves on camera (located in the office).***
- The facility does not have an intrusion detection (burglar) alarm.
- Surveillance systems are not actively monitored when students are present.

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Page 11 **of** 16

Policy/ Staff Training:

This component is descriptive of the review and observations of the written policy and procedure platform currently available, in the subject District/School. It should be noted this component refers only to the written and/or documented policy or procedure for the indicated areas of concern and does not refer to the observed practices noted earlier in this summary.

*Undocumented practices can be, and often are, highly effective. However, they are generally person specific and can change as transmitted from one staff member to another. In addition, such practices run the risk of being completely lost as staff changes. The final vulnerability is the potential that when needed the person with specific knowledge is absent or unavailable. Training from documented procedure is the most effective way to avoid the noted vulnerabilities. This section is also a review of the processes in use to deliver and record the expected training for staff members.

Observations/Review:

- ***Note: The District has recently adopted the "I Love You Guys" – Standard Response Protocol (SRP) for emergency responses to include Lockdown, Lockout, Evacuation, and Shelter.***

    Confusion is consistent among program users as to the old and new procedures. It is encouraged that additional discussion/training take place. Also, when using the system remember to use the entire command to provide clarity, i.e.:
    > ***Lockout! Secure the Perimeter.***
    > ***Lockdown! Locks, Lights, Out of Sight.***
- There is no comprehensive key control policy.
    - ***Note: Due to the age of the school, there are a significant number of school keys out in the public arena. In addition, because of renovations over the years, keys have been added and subtracted from the inventory. A re-evaluation of key control management with discussions on re-keying is recommended.***
- Substitute staff are minimally or not trained on school emergency procedures.
- Volunteer staff are minimally or not trained on school emergency procedures.
- There is minimal or no scheduled cycle for staff training on signs of abuse.
- There is minimal or no scheduled cycle for staff training on dating violence.
- There is minimal or no scheduled cycle for staff training on suspicious package.
- The school has no written plan that addresses perimeter security (doors locked/monitored and who is assigned).
- The school has no written plan that addresses parking lot security (permits, lot monitoring).
- The school has no written plan that addresses end of day security procedures (secure access points, high value areas, alarm set, etc.).
- There is no written supervision plan available.
- The school does not have a written procedure for mental health threat assessment (harm to self, harm to others).
- There is no threat assessment protocol commonly accepted across the District.

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Page 12 **of** 16

- o **Note: A written threat protocol, consistent with the direction from the Secret Service and Department of Education Study, is highly recommended to ensure consistency and effectiveness when handling a threat.**
- The District/School does not have a functional EOP consistent with industry standards.
- Key/identified staff receive minimal or no training (admin, office staff, dept. leaders, counselors, etc.) on NIMS/ICS.
    - o *Note: Incident Command System (ICS) - Since most first responder organizations use the Incident Command System to manage an emergency, it is recommended that school administrators learn what the Incident Command System is and learn what the expectations of the first responders are, during an incident. The school also needs to communicate what they expect from first responders. Collaborating with first responders, in advance of an incident, will help all stakeholders involved to manage an efficient and effective response.*
- Key/identified staff receive minimal or no training (admin, office staff, dept. leaders, counselors, etc.) on armed staff training, if applicable.
- Contracts/Vendors are not required to complete background checks to be on site.

    - o *Note: SAFETY BRIEFS- Use a 5-minute safety briefing approach, at the end of your scheduled cycle meetings, to bring solid awareness and understanding to your emergency management procedures, to include visitors, intruders, lockdowns, situational awareness, etc.*
    - o *REALITY BASED type training is the most effective way to prepare staff, students, and parents. Using regional real life incidents to engage in discussion / training of school policy and procedures is essential. Since training time and funds are limited, prioritization of selected subject matter is paramount.*
    - o *PREVENTION is the primary goal. Training in situational awareness, student – staff relationship building, information gathering, de-escalation, identifying signs of suicide – depression, teaching character development, etc.*
    - o *RESPONSE, if necessary, will be more efficient and effective with engaged stakeholders, who understand each other's process and expectations.*

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Page 13 **of** 16

Community Resources/Partnerships:

This component is descriptive of observations of the processes and interface with outside support agencies. Included are the interaction processes with Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS, and social support services. Your school may have some or all of these agencies available to you. Lack of immediate access to any of these agencies will create a vulnerability.

Observation/Review:

- The County Emergency Manager is not part of your emergency planning.
- The school is not involved with the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC).
    - Note: Unsure if one exists.
- The school is not part of the county's hazard mitigation plan.
- The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) does not make regular presentations to students/staff.
- The Fire Department does make regular presentations to students/staff.
- There are no law enforcement representatives designed for schools.
- Jurisdictional considerations have not been addressed (MOU).

Brian Armes – Manager	**Guy Bliesner – East Idaho**	**Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho**	**Mark Feddersen – North Idaho**
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov	Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov	Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov	Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155	208.221.3145	208.407.6716	208.625.7256

Page 14 **of** 16

School Climate/Culture:

This component is descriptive of observations of the processes in place to provide for a positive educational environment. Included are evidences of parental involvement, student involvement, clear behavioral expectations, physical health, and processes to serve at-risk students.

Note: I observed <u>EXCELLENT</u> Preventive Posture being exercised at Orofino Jr Sr High School. Formalizing the school's monitoring responsibility schedule will ensure all exposure is covered through written assignment.

The school deploys several programs in an effort to provide a positive educational environment, to include:

- **Engagement Vision** - Every student will be well-known, both personally and academically, by at least one adult staff member.
- **Positive Behavior Intervention and Support (PBIS)** - PBIS Improves student behavior through Positive Behavior Intervention and Support. To achieve this goal, four overarching rules have been adopted for all areas of the school. They are:
    - Be Respectful,
    - Be Responsible,
    - Be Safe.
    - Consequences.
- **Nine Characteristics of High Performing Schools:**
    1. A clear and shared focus.
    2. High standards and expectations for all students.
    3. Effective school leadership.
    4. High levels of collaboration and communication.
    5. Curriculum, instruction, and assessments aligned with state standards.
    6. Frequent monitoring of learning and teaching.
    7. Focused Professional development.
    8. A supportive learning environment.
    9. High levels of parent and community involvement.
- **Orofino Social Contract**
    - Value others and respect their ideas with professionalism.
    - Address issues by communicating with the person first, solving conflicts openly and face to face.
    - Focus on dealing with the small things at their lowest level, before they get out of hand.
    - Avoid gossip, being part of the solution by participating in courageous conversations.
- **Maniac Pride:**
    - **P**ersonal Achievement.
    - **R**espect.
    - **I**nvolvement.
    - **D**etermination.

Brian Armes – Manager   Guy Bliesner – East Idaho   Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho   Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov   Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov   Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov   Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155   208.221.3145   208.407.6716   208.625.7256

Page 15 **of** 16

- o **E**xcellence.
- **Creating A Team:**
  - o **T**ake Time To Learn About Your Team.
  - o **E**stablish A Reasonable Plan.
  - o **A**ppreciate The Positive Aspects Of Teaming.
  - o **M**eet Often.

Observation/Review:

- The school does not have a multi-disciplinary behavioral threat assessment process.
  - o **Note: A written threat protocol, consistent with the direction from the Secret Service and Department of Education Study, is highly recommended to ensure consistency and effectiveness when handling a threat.**
- Nurse is not available on campus at least half time.
- The nurse is not available for basic student care.
- The nurse is not available for student assistance teams.

Brian Armes – Manager
Brian.Armes@dbs.idaho.gov
208.33.7155

Guy Bliesner – East Idaho
Guy.Bliesner@dbs.idaho.gov
208.221.3145

Mike Munger – Southwest Idaho
Mike.Munger@dbs.idaho.gov
208.407.6716

Mark Feddersen – North Idaho
Mark.Feddersen@dbs.idaho.gov
208.625.7256

Page 16 **of** 16